HEADQUARTERS BASE SECTION NO. 3

Brisbane February 3, 1942

From:      US Naval Intelligence Officer, Staff.

To:          The Commanding Officer, Base Section #3.

Subject:   Intelligence Report.

1. On January 26, 1942, the Commanding Officer ordered that a certain vessel be furnished with the route and other needed material to safeguard her voyage. He further ordered that this material and route should be forwarded immediately upon the copying of the route after the despatch of the vessel to one Commander Causey, US Naval Attache, Australia, member of the Ship Movements Board.

2. At 2300 Hours according to the receipt in this office, the above material was handed in to the message centre, 28 January, 1942 for safe hand to naval attache.

3. On Friday last Colonel Chamberlain called Major Dietz and stated, “The naval officer up there has everything all mixed up. That route isn't here!"

4. In the evening of Friday a secraphone conversation was held between Major Dietz and Colonel Chamberlain and the information which was contained in the packet was demanded immediately by the colonel. A signal had gone to the colonel in Melbourne as of Friday, 30 January, saying that the ship had been routed and all was in order and that the information was available from Commander Causey in Melbourne. The colonel evidently did not believe this. It was demanded that immediate receipt be arranged. Major Dietz suggested that this officer be sent. Colonel Chamberlain so ordered it by the earliest method of transportation available.

5. Having copied and worked all routes this officer then departed for Melbourne. Arriving there he was unable to immediately contact Colonel Chamberlain and was ordered by the aide to General Barnes to see about it in the morning.

6. On Sunday morning the packet was given to Colonel Chamberlain and Commander Causey. At a conference attended by Major General Barnes, Colonel Chamberlain, Military Attache Colonel Smith, Commander Causey and Major Anse (sp?) and this officer, plans to despatch the Coastal Farmer and Admiral Halstead on a Mission to Luzon were discussed and the order was given. Major Anse was dispatched to Sidney (sic) and Brisbane to give ciphers to ships. Major Anse was ordered to inform “Colonel Johnson that he has nothing to do with these ships after they leave Brisbane.” This order repeated, having been given by Colonel Chamberlain, and the major was sent on his way."

This officer was then ordered to show what he had done for the Don Isidro “if anything.” The route was shown and no objection was made thereto. The code was shown. The day identification letters and their promulgation to all areas concerned (this a copy of a despatch elicited from Naval Board by this officer) were shown. The key day words to obviate the enemy giving this vessel false messages were shown. It was stated that this officer had given the Don Isidro additional protection by a set of Japanese answering signals. The time of special broadcast and the intelligence liaison organisation for this vessel were explained.

Commander Causey said he was not convinced about the code and sharply ordered a message to be encoded. This message was encoded with Lt. Ranier of the Signal Corps so that he would know, and be able to send messages. The code was then found to be workable and Commander Causey said no more.

6. Having been ordered to wait upon a further interview on Monday and feeling disquiet Contact at the treatment received this officer reported the matter further to the officer in charge of G-2 Melbourne and placed that office in contact with by Base Section Three’s G-2. A search was made and although a preliminary trace was made at both ends, nothing could be discovered. As the disappearance of a safehand is considered extremely serious much effort was made.

7. At 3 o’clock in the afternoon of Monday this officer was to see Colonel Smith and Commander Causey. This meeting was ordered by Colonel Chamberlain.

At 4 o’clock this meeting was held, though this officer had several times protested his delay in Melbourne on the grounds that he had work to do there. He was detained by the statement of Commander Causey that no one in Brisbane worked.

The preceding night, this officer had had an interview with the Commanding General at the insistence of Mr Grimm on the grounds that the general must be informed of the folly of sending the Coast Farmer and Admiral Halstead to Luzon and the further folly of routing them past Thursday Island, New Guinea and past the Japanese land sea and air bases on Amboine (sic). The general directed that this information be told to Colonel Chamberlain. The general wished to discuss the disappearance of the safehand. This officer said that it might have been removed from the plane between Brisbane and Melbourne. The general asked who would want that information who had access to the planes. The name Sir Thomas Gordon appeared in the conversation.

Thus, on 4 o’clock 2 February 1942, this officer was prepared to relate this information. He had been refused entrance to Colonel Chamberlain. He attempted to speak of the matter to Commander Causey but was ordered to be silent about it, even though the demeanour of this officer was uniformly courteous.

This officer found himself being “tried” by the military attache Colonel Smith. The recorder was Lt. Odell, USA. Commander Causey was a spectator in agreement with Colonel Smith and saw nothing wrong with a naval officer being disciplined by Colonel Smith while he, Commander Causey, was present.

All telegrams save two despatched by this officer were produced and close questioning was given this officer concerning each. The two missing telegrams were those in which this officer had reported by despatch to the CinC Asiatic as being assigned to duty on the staff of Base Section Three until further information from the CinC Asiatic . The other missing telegram was that one in which this officer had reported himself to Commander Causey as being with Colonel Johnson, this officer having already been granted such assignment by Command Causey orally.

The various telegrams were carefully covered by the military attache.

Having done with the messages, Colonel Smith then began to question closely concerning the actual identity of this officer. He was visibly startled to discover that this officer was fully accredited as of the Office of Naval Intelligence, was under orders to the Asiatic and was in order in general.

The following hour was spent in close cross-questioning this officer with regard to the extent of his knowledge of Sir Thomas Gordon. This officer divulged very little. This officer refused to let Colonel Smith have entered into the record words which Colonel Smith said as coming from this officer, “Then you say that you have no knowledge whatever that Sir Thomas Gordon is anything but a loyal citizen” (paraphrase). This officer said he admitted no extent of any knowledge whatever and would not admit to knowing nothing about Sir Thomas Gordon. This was ended on the record as “Hubbard uncertain.”

This officer was then criticised for sending the Don Isidro out of her way around the south of Australia. “Three thousand miles out of her way,” stated Commander Causey. This officer informed them that Torres Straits were closed to British Vessels and cited Commander Thompson of the local Naval Control Service as his authority. This authority and the word of this officer was questioned. This officer stated that the Don Isidro proceeded south on the specific orders of Colonel Johnson and that it was only two days further sailing distance and that the safety of the vessel was less in peril. This officer begged Commander Causey to look at the Contact Map in G-2 which contains all reported information on the enemy and Commander Causey refused, saying he needed nothing like that. Neither officer had ever seen this map in G-2 at USAHQ.

Until now this officer had answered all questions politely if briefly.

Commander Causey thereupon remarked, “I have sent a message to the CinC I Asiatic as of this morning stating that I wish you to be removed from Brisbane, stating that you are making a nuisance of yourself. You have never been under my orders and I consider you as having nothing to do with me. If you wish to serve with Johnson, that is up to you.”

This officer was shocked at the precipitate action for he was in the knowledge that he had never acted without the advice and order of Colonel Johnson. No hearing was given at the time the message was sent.

Commander Causey then stated, “Colonel Johnson is doing all this and blaming it on you and me.”

Without taking leave or further addressing either officer, who were now standing in the hall, their conversation and comment overheard widely, this officer put on his cap and left headquarters.

8. It was stated by Commander Causey in this interview that he had had the “missing” packet all the time. 9. On return to Brisbane, this officer was informed by Major Dietz that the major had known the packet was “found” again. 10. The comment of Major General Barnes on the arrangements made for the Don Isidro was as follows, “Personally I think you did a very good job.”