MELBOURNE COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE UNIT
IN AUSTRALIA DURING WWII

Attempts to establish a Cryptographic Organisation

Commander Long, the Director of Naval Intelligence wrote a memo to D.S.C, A.C.N.S. and the Chief of Naval Staff on 29 November 1939 recommending the establishment of a Cryptographic Organisation along the lines of the Government Code and Cypher School in London to break down enemy codes and cyphers. Commander Long forwarded a copy of this memo to C.G.S. (M.I.) the following day.

The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Ragnar Colvin, wrote a Minute Paper to the Department of Navy on 12 December 1939 stating that if such an organisation was necessary it would need to be referred to the Defence Committee as it would involve all three military services. He also commented that there would need to be a large volume of material for such a unit to be viable. He indicated that advice and assistance would first need to be obtained from the Government and Cyphering School in London before justifying the establishment of a Cryptographic Organisation in Australia.

The Chief of the General Staff, responded to Admiral Colvin's Minute Paper on 16 December 1939 suggesting that the matter be referred to the Defence Committee. He indicated that the "Manual of Military Intelligence in the Field" provided for a sub-section of Military Intelligence to deal with Signal Intelligence with duties including cryptography and translation as follows:-

(i)    Decoding and deciphering intercepted enemy code and cipher messages whatever the method of signalling

(ii)  Translation of decoded or deciphered messages from the enemy language into English

(iii) Technical advice on code and cipher questions and assistance in the preparation of codes and ciphers for use in the field.

The Chief of General Staff indicated that he believed that there should be at "least a nucleus organisation in Australia against the contingencies of operations in and about Australia and her Territories."  He also acknowledged that the "aid of the British authorities should be invoked."  He also commented as follows:-

So far as the Army is concerned the type of materiel mainly required for practice is that transmitted by the Japanese in the course of their operations in China. While some of this may be intercepted direct (thus giving practice to signal personnel as well) a considerable quantity would have to come from the British organization in the Far East."

Minute Paper No. 10/1940 from the Defence Committee Meeting held on Thursday 15 February 1940 stated as follows:-

The Defence Committee considered a minute for the Chief of the Naval Staff to the Chief of the General Staff and and the Chief of the Air Staff, in which he drew attention to the suggestion that it might be desirable to set up in Australia a cryptographic organization on the lines of the Government Code and Cypher School in London, with a view to breaking down enemy codes and cyphers. The Committee also had before it minutes for the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff giving their views and recommendations as to this matter.

2. The Defence Committee recommended that, as a preliminary to any further action, the advice and assistance of the United Kingdom authorities should be sought.

On 11 April 1940, Despatch No 88 was sent from the Prime Minister of Australia to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on the possible establishment of a Cryptographic Organization in Australia. This despatch concluded that there seemed no valid reason for setting up a full scale cryptographic organization in Australia on the lines of the Government Code and Cypher School in London. But went on to state that it did appear desirable to examine the possibility of establishing a nucleus organisation in Australia to guard against the contingency of operations in and about Australia and her Territories. The Prime Minister sought the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the matter.

Minute No. 121/1940 of the Defence Committee meeting held on Thursday 5 December 1940 noted that the Defence Committee considered Dominion Office Despatch No. 198 of 15 October 1940 regarding the establishment of a nucleus Special Intelligence Organisation as as per Minute No. 10/1940 dated 15 February 1940. It was decided to defer consideration of the matter, pending discussions by the Chief of the Naval Staff with the Chief of the Naval Intelligence Staff, Far East, who was to arrive in Australia in December 1940. It was agreed that the Chief of the Naval Staff should take up with the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff, the question of the training of Military and Air Force personnel in this form of special intelligence.

Unofficial Army Group studied Japanese Codes

In about mid January 1940 a small unofficial Army group at the University of Sydney that studied Japanese codes was established by Eastern Command, Australian Army under the leadership of Mathematics Professor, Thomas Gerald Room. He was assisted by Mr. Richard Jenkins Lyons. Later additions to the group were Arthur Dale Trendall and Athanasius Pryor Treweek (a linguist) who were both members of the Greek Department. They handled many coded messages supplied to them by the Censorship Staff.

Cryptographic Section, Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit

The Australian Government established a cryptographic analysis unit at Victoria Barracks on St. Kilda Road in Melbourne to decipher Japanese diplomatic codes. Commander Theodore Eric Nave, R.N. established the Navy unit in July 1940 which was known as the Cryptographic Section, Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit.

By October 1940, Room and Lyons were attempting to crack the Japanese diplomatic and commercial codes by reducing the cipher groups into a Romanised Japanese text, which would then be able to be read by Japanese Linguists. This unofficial group did cryptographic work for the Australian Army.

"Eric" Nave recruited Professor Room and his three colleagues into this cryptographic analysis unit. This followed a meeting that Nave had organised with Commander Long, Col McKenzie, Lt. Col. Edwards, Major O'Connor, Captain Fleiter of the Australian Army and Professor Room and Major Treweek (Militia) on 2 May 1941.

Room and Treweek agreed to relocate to Melbourne subject to the approval of the University of Sydney. The Australian Army convinced the University to release Room and Treweek who relocated to Melbourne to join the unit which was known as the Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit (or sometimes referred to as the Special Intelligence Section). Major Treweek was the first to report to the unit in Melbourne in mid June 1941.

A copy of the four-figure recyphered code "Merchant Ships Naval Liaison Cypher" was received by the RAN in June 1941. It was a photographic copy of the original which had been acquired by the US Navy. This book had been in use for 2 1/2 years. Traffic was very light but increased to some half a dozen messages per day during July 1941, and early August 1941, the period during which the Japanese crisis was threatening. This traffic was read up until a new system, later designated as JN 39 was introduced. It was also a four-figure recyphered code. No attempts were made by this unit to read this new code.

Professor Room and Major Treweek started work in the unit led by Commander Nave on 18 August 1941. Some discussion was held on an appropriate rank and pay level for Professor Room but it was eventually decided that he would remain as a civilian in this military intelligence unit.

In about September 1941, Professor Room and Lieutenant Jamieson went to Bandung in Java to observe the intelligence techniques of the Dutch unit Kamer 14. They then travelled to the British Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) in Singapore to learn the code breaking methodology used by the British. The British Far East Combined Bureau was a sub unit of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) in London. Bletchley Park was another sub unit of GC&CS. FECB had been collaborating in secret with the US Navy unit in the Philippines. The importance of the use of tabulators such as the IBM Tabulator were later realised by these groups.

Professor Trendall joined the group in Melbourne in about December 1941 / January 1942. Special Intelligence Section started work on the Japanese Diplomatic Cyphers in December 1941.

Members of the Cryptographic Section, Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit in order of appointment were as follows:-

The Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit intercepted and deciphered the diplomatic message sent from Japan on Tuesday 2 December 1941 ordering the Japanese Consulate in Melbourne to burn all their documents relating to codes or coded messages. Commander Eric Nave warned the Royal Australian Navy that Japan may start a war by the weekend. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

The Cryptographic Section, Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit moved from Victoria Barracks to Monterey Flats in February 1942 and was co-located with the US Navy's Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne FRUMEL.

The Special Intelligence Section (SIS) began work on Japanese Diplomatic cyphers in February 1942 (another record in National Archives suggested that this began in Dec 1941). Four codes and two cyphers were in force at that time, namely JAH, JAI, JAJ an JAK codes and JAA and JAF cyphers all of which were used in conjunction with the number and address codes "NU" and "TO".

The Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit (SIS) had worked on the following codes:-

The Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit managed to break the following Japanese systems:-

In the recovery of keys and values in the many phases of the JN 20 and JN 40 (approx. 15 in each), consistent and substantial contributions were made towards the speed with which these systems were read. In the work on JN 20, the Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit shared the honours for the recovery of keys with the Washington Unit, and in the JN 40, with the Honolulu Unit.

With JN 11, the shortage of staff available did not permit research or additive recovery to any appreciable extent; the staff being fully employed on the routine of reading current traffic and the research attached thereto. The staff was increased and a small research section contributed solutions and recoveries in such sections of the work (which then included JN 19) as could be handled by their limited numbers.

In the JN 4, 14 and 147 Section, the emphasis was also on the reading of current traffic. Research was spasmodic for two reasons. Until early 1944, no mechanical aids were available and there was never sufficient staff available to cope with all requirements. After May 1944, full co-operation of the machine room was obtained but only on condition that the JN 25 work retained its priority. By correlating information supplied by the JN 11 and JN 40 sections, with occurrences of certain groups in the locally intercepted traffic, however, a certain number of specific values for dates, times, latitudes, etc. and which were normally difficult to recover, was always supplied to the other units.

This R.A.N. Unit, when an independent unit, lacked the necessary experienced personnel, equipment and staff to handle adequately the recovery and reading of the Minor Systems. When close liaison with FRUMEL and later British Units was established, the gaps caused by these deficiencies were closed, enabling the unit and, later the Minor System Section, to handle the reading of the systems efficiently, and to contribute to the general progress up to the limit of the abilities of its members.

Research work was necessarily restricted to such as could be handled by one or two officers, with one or two assistants, but the standard of achievement was high. The general efficiency of the Minor Systems Section of the the Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit, and the abilities of its members, enabled it to contribute towards the combined success on a scale that placed it ahead of all other Units on a production per capita basis.

Members of the WRANS were entrusted with the decyphering and decoding of traffic in readable, and partially readable systems. Their work was tedious and monotonous, and uninspiring as much of the traffic, naturally, was of little intelligence value. In spite of this, the WRANS remained cheerful and willing. Many of them developed great skills, sometimes outstanding, and showed initiative in dealing with the problems associated with their work. This devotion to duty advanced materially the efficiency of the Unit.

From time to time, materiel intercepted by the local Censorship Authorities was passed to the Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit for examination. Several were documents suspected of being in code or cypher, but examination showed that they were not. A document in cypher taken from a recaptured German POW escapee was broken down by Lieutenant Commander Keith Miller into German plain language. It was translated by an interpreter from Censorship, and proved to be a copy of the deck and engine room logs of the German raider "Kormoran", covering the period of its encounter with HMAS Sydney which resulted in the loss of both ships.

Lieutenant Colonel Treweek, at the request of a special unit of the Australian Army Signal Corps, from time to time, examined the security of various cyphers introduced or invented by that unit.

General Douglas MacArthur eventually escaped out of the Philippines in mid March 1942 and established his General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area in Collins Street, Melbourne. An Allied Signals Intelligence Unit called Central Bureau (CB) was established in Melbourne under the command of General S.B. Akin. Central Bureau operated from a large private house. The American component of Central Bureau was led by Major Abe Sinkov. Commander Nave's group with Room, Treweek and Lyons worked in the Monterey flats where the US Navy's Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne FRUMEL was located.

General Douglas MacArthur transferred his GHQ SWPA to Brisbane in July 1942 and Central Bureau relocated to a large two story house at 21 Henry Street, Ascot in Brisbane and a number of huts were erected in nearby Ascot Park beside Ascot Racetrack (Camp Ascot Park). Central Bureau was Australia's equivalent of Bletchley Park during WWII.

Commander Nave collaborated with both FRUMEL and Central Bureau. Lieutenant Commander Fabian, the Commanding Officer of FRUMEL grew increasingly unhappy with Nave's collaboration with Central Bureau. The British Admiralty were keen for Commander Nave to return to the Royal Navy, but it was eventually decided that Nave and his group should transfer to Central Bureau in November 1942. Richard Lyons returned to University of Sydney. Trendall and Treweek remained in Melbourne in a small Diplomatic Cipher group led by Treweek which became known as "D" Special Section or Diplomatic Special Section. Eric Barnes later joined this small group which may have also used the term Special Intelligence Section.  The remainder of the Cryptographic Section, Melbourne Communications Intelligence Unit then merged with FRUMEL after Commander Nave and Professor Room transferred to Central Bureau.

A file in National Archives of Australia titled "Special Intelligence Section report - Japanese Diplomatic cyphers" lists the following personnel in Special Intelligence Section:-

PERSONNEL OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE 1942-5

(a) Technical

Professor A.D. Trendall (University of Sydney)
NX139540 Lieut. R.S. Bond
N450470 Lieut. E.S. Barnes

NX139427 WO.II K.L. McKay
NX82807 Sgt. A.C. Eastway
VX94295 Cpl. I.H. Smith
Clerical duties: V.143841 Sgt. P. Grange

The following personnel were lent to Special Intelligence through the kind offices of Lt. Col. A.W. Sandford, C.O. Central Bureau, during heavy periods.

Sgt. A.W.F. Rogers
Sgt. H.W. MacKenzie
WO.II P. Pledger
Sgt. J.C. Davies
Pte. K. McLeod

(b) Language and Translation

Mr. C.H. Archer        British Foreign Office
Mr. H.A. Graves            "           "          "
Mr. A.R.V. Cooper        "           "          "
Mr. R.L. Cowley           "           "          "
Mr. E.T. Biggs              "           "          "
Lt. C.A. James           British Army
Miss M. Tilley
WO.II B. Pitman        British Army   )   Lent by
VX128886 Cpl. D.S.C. Sissons        )   Central Bureau
                                                              for short
                                                              periods of
                                                              heavy pressure

A staff of typists and female clerks was headed by Miss. R. Shearer.

Mr. C.H. Archer returned to England in December 1944 and Mr. R.L. Cowley then took over control of the Language and Translation Section.

REFERENCE BOOKS

Sydney University, T.G. Room and Codebreaking in WWII
by Peter Donovan (School of Mathematics, UNSW) and John Mack (School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sydney)

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This page first produced 18 October 2021

This page last updated 18 October 2021