RAAF IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES
DURING WWII

Special Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area showed a progression from early, limited RAAF support to a purpose-built RAAF–SRD air-insertion system centred on 200 Flight and Leyburn. By 1945 that system was enabling parachute insertions, supply drops, reconnaissance, air liaison, casualty evacuation, target direction, and close air support across Timor, Borneo, the Celebes, and the Moluccas.

1. Early relationship: access to aircraft was the central problem, 1942–44

When ISD was established in 1942, Lt-Col Mott was authorised to seek staff or assistance from the Allied services, RAN, and RAAF. But the RAAF was not free to allocate aircraft directly for Special Operations (SO). In the SWPA command structure, operational RAAF forces came under General Kenney; Air Vice-Marshal Jones retained administrative and training responsibilities, while Air Vice-Marshal Bostock commanded RAAF forces under Kenney. The official history stresses that aircraft for SO work normally required reference to GHQ SWPA. This was the main structural obstacle to SRD’s early air plans.

The RAAF nevertheless contributed personnel, equipment, intelligence, and facilities. SRD’s later establishment included 13 RAAF/WAAAF officers and 24 other ranks; an RAAF sergeant, H. W. Clapinson, appears in the SRD casualty return as missing on Operation Hawk. RAAF stores could be drawn through the appropriate administrative channels, and SRD at Morotai drew on RAAF stocks during shortages.

At Darwin, cooperation became practical as well as administrative. F/Lt Brierley, RAAF, was SRD’s intelligence and air-liaison officer in Darwin from 1944. He handled local intelligence, operational briefing, communication with Melbourne and other services, and contact with the RAAF. SRD also drew operational intelligence from RAAF sources, used Darwin airfield, shared an area with the RAAF at a station under AIB control, and benefited from workshops, slipway, and equipment supplied by the adjacent Catalina squadron and flying-boat maintenance unit.

In Timor, RAAF aircraft were sometimes unavailable for extraction or reinforcement; for example, the Dutch aircraft allocated to Operation Sunable were withdrawn and the RAAF could not spare an alternative. Conversely, RAAF intelligence identified a possible enemy barge-staging point at Operation Adder’s intended insertion cove, and information on SRD cache sites was passed to the RAAF for its Roger Points system for downed airmen.

2. Air Section, Para Wing, and the creation of 200 Flight

SRD’s Air Section emerged because normal requests for aircraft and crews did not meet the requirements of covert air insertion. The official history says SRD first sought a dedicated special unit in February 1944 but was unsuccessful. It therefore formed a small parachute-maintenance and paratroop-training unit at Fraser Island’s Fraser Commando School FCS, with valuable RAAF personnel and equipment assistance. This became Para Wing, under SRD Air Section.

After GHQ SWPA approved a series of air-insertion and supply operations in January 1945, the situation changed. Allied Air Forces ordered the RAAF to form a special unit. The result was 200 Flight: six B-24 Liberators modified to SRD Air Section requirements. In February 1945, the Flight was allotted to AIB for parachute training, personnel dropping, and supply dropping; the official history says SRD was effectively its only user among AIB’s organisations.

The arrangement was a hybrid, rather than a transfer of the Flight to SRD:

• 200 Flight remained operationally responsible to RAAF Command.
• RAAF GI Operations RAAF Command issued its instructions.
• The commanding officer of 200 Flight controlled each mission once ordered.
• SRD Air Section controlled Para Wing policy and activities.
• SRD Air Section’s officer often supplied the specialist operational appreciation that RAAF Command lacked for this particular kind of work.

Thus SRD planned and defined the Special Operations requirement, while the RAAF retained aircraft command and formal operational authority. Air Section itself contained four RAAF officers and three WAAAF other ranks at full strength.

3. Leyburn: the operational heart of the system

Leyburn, Queensland, was 200 Flight’s home station and the Para Wing’s base. It was not simply a departure airfield. It combined security, specialist training, parachute maintenance, briefing, packing, stores, and operational despatch in one place.

Its functions included:

• aircrew and paratroop training;
• parachute packing and maintenance;
• pre-operational preparation and briefing;
• packing and despatch of supply-dropping equipment;
• storage of parachutes, storpedos, packages, weapons, ammunition, food, and other operational stores;
• preparation of B-24s for personnel and supply drops;
• initial party insertions, normally staged via forward SRD bases; and
• four-jump qualification, Eureka/Rebecca, and S-phone instruction for SRD personnel.

Exercises at Leyburn with 200 Flight Liberators in April 1945 taught parties how to receive air-dropped stores. From June, SRD personnel were to qualify through four Liberator jumps there.

Leyburn’s location also exposed a logistical weakness. It was near Brisbane and about 140 miles from the SRD Brisbane office, but too far south of the forward operational areas. Holding sufficient stocks there duplicated personnel and dispersed stores; in forward areas, SRD still had to use general transport squadrons and place its own despatchers aboard aircraft. The Brisbane office handled an average of about 400 people per month after Para Wing was established at Leyburn.

4. 200 Flight in operations

The official history’s January–August 1945 maintenance table records 91 aircraft sorties for the listed SRD projects, of which 200 Flight flew 78. That makes it the dominant air-insertion and air-maintenance unit in the record.

In Timor and adjacent islands, 200 Flight inserted or supported several parties:

• Sunable: a Liberator of 200 Flight dropped the party near Cape Batoemerah on 27 June 1945.
• Sunbaker: A72-159 of 200 Flight conducted a pre-insertion reconnaissance; it was subsequently lost.
• Sunlag: delayed by difficulty obtaining aircraft, then inserted by 200 Flight on 29 June.
• Suncob: inserted by 200 Flight on 2 July.
• Salmon: the record identifies A72-159 of 200 Flight in a reconnaissance related to the wider SRD–NEFIS Java intelligence plan.

The loss of A72-159 became part of the Operation Groper inquiry: SRD sent the recovered identifying information to the RAAF, which identified the wreckage as the missing Liberator. The operations record also includes RAAF personnel among the lost or involved parties and records RAAF aircraft lifting released SRD prisoners from Bali to Singapore in October 1945.

In North Borneo, 200 Flight supported the Agas operations. Agas II was parachuted near Lokopas from a 200 Flight B-24 on 3 May 1945. On 21 May, B-24 A72-177 crashed while making a personnel-and-stores insertion sortie to Agas II. Major Nick Combe, the officer at the dropping zone, reported five circuits at very low altitude; after the fifth, the port wing struck a tree and the aircraft crashed and burned. The document also records conflicting eyewitness testimony of cloudier conditions, so the cause should be treated as the contemporary accounts rather than an independently settled finding. Agas III reinforcements were dropped from 200 Flight Liberators at Lansat on 18 August.

5. Semut: the clearest example of RAAF–SRD integration

The Semut operations in Borneo show the RAAF’s role expanding beyond insertion. The availability of 200 Flight attached to AIB made an air insertion practicable. RAAF 200 Flight assisted Major Harrison’s reconnaissance of a more central dropping zone; Semut I was then inserted at Bario on 23 March 1945 by two 200 Flight B-24s after four unsuccessful sorties. One B-24, commanded by S/Ldr Pockley, was lost on its return journey.

Thereafter the RAAF supported Semut through several complementary functions:

• 200 Flight and other aircraft inserted personnel, stores, and reinforcements.
• Catalinas landed on the Baram River and later made frequent supply and reinforcement sorties.
• SRD parties selected and reported targets.
• RAAF aircraft attacked communications, installations, Japanese concentrations, and movement routes.
• RAAF pilots were brought into the field during Catalina sorties so they could understand SRD’s ground warfare and target requirements.
• I Tactical Air Force, transport aircraft, and Catalinas helped sustain Semut when the 9th Australian Division was limited to a narrow coastal area.

The operations history attributes the severing of W/T and telephone communications in central Brunei Bay, attacks on the Tagai sawmill, and disruption at Malinau to RAAF strikes based on Semut intelligence. RAAF support at Pa Tengoa prevented Japanese forces consolidating. Without I TAF’s close support, transport aircraft, and Catalinas, Operation Semut would have been impossible to maintain in that period.

6. Other RAAF roles in the operations record

Other RAAF support outside the 200 Flight framework:

• 2 Squadron RAAF dropped food and a rubber boat to Sunlag near the Dilor River.
• 82 Wing, North Western Area, supplied Binatang by Liberator.
• 24 Squadron RAAF, Darwin, made Menzies drops.
• RAAF Meteorological Service was consulted about radiosonde equipment for Lennons.
• 113 ASR Squadron RAAF used a Catalina for Platypus VIII.
• RAAF Transport Command C-47s made a successful Platypus VIII stores drop from Morotai.
• RAAF Command at Balikpapan was asked to provide Catalina insertion and Spitfire cover.
• 1 TAF RAAF allotted Catalinas for Giraffe operations and provided fighter attacks.
• RAAF North Western Area undertook photographic reconnaissance for Garfish.
• RAAF personnel appear in SRD parties including Beetle, Agas III, Semut, Platypus, J Mission, Finch, and Crocodile.

7. Proposal to use RAAF Helicopters

Whilst recently researching the Services Reconnaissance Department SRD and “Z” Special Unit, I came across this entry in a history of SRD’s proposed plan for Project Falcon:-

“First conceived in Aug 43, the Falcon project in its original form envisaged simultaneous attacks on thirteen enemy bases located in an area from Timor to New Ireland. The bases first selected were Koepang, Dilli and Fuiloro in Timor; Ambon and Boela in Ceram; Taberfane in the Aroe Islands; Babo, But, Wewak, Nubia and Madang in New Guinea; Rabaul in New Britain; and Kavieng in New Ireland.”

“The estimated maximum potential damage to be achieved was the destruction of 115,000 tons of shipping, 220 aircraft, 18,000,000 gallons of oil storage capacity, 14 oil wells and 3 radar installations. The personnel implication was 17 officers and 69 ORs, and the transport requirements comprised sorties by 2 submarines, 2 Catalinas, 8 Douglas C47, 2 PT Boats and 11 Helicopters. However, owing to unavailability of helicopters the number of submarine sorties was increased to five.”

Helicopters in August 1943!!

I initially thought it must have been a mistake. However further research revealed there was a definite desire by the Australian Army to obtain helicopters that early in WWII.

I found the following document date 21 July 1943 on the National Archives of Australia site. It was addressed to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff from the Major-General Steele, Engineer-in-Chief of the Department of the Army:-

Major Harold Joseph Myslis (NX70800) wrote the following record of his discussion with Mr L. J. Wackett from CAC about local production of helicopters:-

Clearly Mr. Wackett was not interested in building helicopters for the Australian Military.

Another memo dated 29 October 1943 stated that the most recent advice from Washington D.C. dated 16 October 1943, indicated that the prototype R5 Helicopter had completed 10 hours flying and the first production R5 was expected to leave the production line in March 1944. The tare weight of the R5 was 3,680 lbs and the gross weight was 6,000 lbs and it had a maximum speed to date of 65 miles per hour. Its final top speed was expected to be 125 mph at 5,000 feet.

In early 1944 there were two brands of helicopters being trialled or produced for the US military:-

·       Sikorsky (R4, R5, & R6)

·       Platt LePage (XR1 & XR1A)

I then found Air Board Agendum No 5879 dated 1 June 1944 which noted that although the Australian Army had a requirement for 25 Helicopters, the 1944 production in America had already been allocated between the US Army, US Navy, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. The document noted that if an early bid was submitted, it was probable that six Helicopters could be made available to the RAAF by the Munitions Assignment Committee (Air), Washington.

The Air Board meeting on 2 June 1944 endorsed the acquisition of six Sikorsky Helicopter Type R5 aircraft and an initial range of spares from the USA at an estimated value of £108,000. As the Helicopters were to be provided under Lend Lease arrangements, no actual expenditure was to be involved. This project was later approved by War Cabinet and endorsed by General Douglas MacArthur.

Arrangements were to be made for 2 pilots, 1 Engineer Officer and 1 Technical NCO to be trained in the USA in the operation of the helicopter.

The Air Board Minute noted that the Helicopters were required by the RAAF to provide services for the Australian Army for operations in closed country for the purpose of:-

(a)   Delivering small parcels of urgent supplies

(b)   Transporting personnel to forward positions

(c)   Evacuating wounded and

(d)   For requirements where ordinary aircraft could not operate

Following the cessation of hostilities in August 1945 and a review of aircraft requirements for the RAAF, a further Air Board meeting dated 2 October 1945 approved, subject to Ministerial approval, that the approval given under Air Board Agendum No. 5879 be withdrawn and that the War Cabinet be advised of the cancellation of authorised funds amounting to £108,000.

Whilst the Sikorsky R-5 Helicopters ordered for Australia never eventuated, several Sikorsky R-4 Helicopters did see service in Burma, China and the Pacific during WWII. R-4s were used for rescue duties in Burma and China. R-4Bs were used to ferry parts between floating Aviation Repair Units in the South Pacific. Each Repair Ship was assigned two Sikorsky R-4B Hoverfly Helicopters. The R-4Bs were also used for observation, spotting downed aircraft, rescue and transporting personnel between ships and to shore.

Overall assessment

SRD did not possess an independent air arm. Its early operations were constrained by the RAAF’s SWPA command arrangements and the scarcity of aircraft. But by early 1945, 200 Flight and Para Wing created a specialised RAAF–SRD system in which Leyburn trained people, prepared equipment, and launched the operational cycle. From there, 200 Flight became SRD’s principal dedicated aircraft resource, while the wider RAAF provided intelligence, reconnaissance, fighters, Catalinas, transport, stores, air-sea-rescue support, and evacuation.

200 Flight was a RAAF Flight tailored to SRD requirements, formally under RAAF command and operationally indispensable to SRD.

REFERENCES

[The Official History of the Operations and Administration of] Special Operations - Australia [(SOA), also known as the Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) and Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD)] Volume 1 - Organisation - copy no 1 [for Director, Military Intelligence (DMI), Headquarters (HQ), Australian Military Forces (AMF), Melbourne] - NAA Item ID 235324

The Official History of the Operations and Administration of] Special Operations - Australia [(SOA), also known as the Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) and Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD)] Volume 2 - Operations - copy no 1 [for Director, Military Intelligence (DMI), Headquarters (HQ), Australian Military Forces (AMF), Melbourne] - NAA Item ID 235327

Can anyone help me with more information?

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This page first produced 2 September 2026

This page last updated 20 April 2024