ACTION REPORT

26.10.41
Detached KILMERLAND. Drew away to westward to effect alterations to engines. Exchange of Nos. 1 and 2 engines.

Midday: sighted an American, turned away. Then effected alterations. Alterations completed by (four figures omitted). Trial run with trouble. Proceeded on agent's was, as still time before new moon. Intend to be off PERTH by then. Report of CORNWALL with convoy off Cape Leeuwin course west. Altered course to NE in consequence.

Intention: investigation of coast off SHARKS BAY.

Wednesday 19.11
Course 25, speed 11; 26.34 South, 111 East. SSE 3 to 4, Sea 3 medium swell from SW. Very clear.

1555:   
Look out JANSEN reports sailing ship in sight on port bow, bearing approx. 20º true. Report corrected currently to 2 sailing ships, several vessel, 2 smoke clouds, apparently escort.

Alarm. Turned away to port on to 260. Full speed ahead.

1600:   
Cruiser made out, identified as PERTH class, on course South. Course 250 into the sun. Approach of darkness not due before 1900. Producing large quantities of smoke ourselves. Engine room reports: No. 4 engine out of order. Speed therefore approx. 14 knots.

1605:   
Cruiser turns towards;    range over 150 hm.

Approaches slowly making "NNJ" repeatedly on searchlight. Hoist signal for STRAAT. Appreciate situation and make decision.

1645:  
No. 4 engine running again on 8 cylinders. Speed 14 maintained. At 80 hm ceased measurement with 3 metre rangefinder, for reasons of disguise, continued ranging with 1.35 metre rangefinder. Continual signalling. Cruiser apraches slowly on teh starboard quarter showing narrow silhouette.

1700:   
Report on 600 metres QQQ STRAAT EBFS. PERTH radio repeats and requests further report is necessary.

1715:   
Cruiser draws away on starboard beam 90 hm distant.

1725:
Morse signal in (MAKS): HOIST YOUR SECRET CALL.

Further delay can only make situation worse. (Cruiser) stops engines, thus has not the least suspicion.
Therefore

1730:
Removal of disguise. Dutch flag struck, War flag flies clear from mast. Time taken 6 seconds. Guns and torpedo given permission to fire. Enemy drops slowly astern.

2 torpedoes inclination 80, speed 14, point of aim bow and stern. Also slow alteration to 260 so as not to interfere with guns. First salvo single shot short. Gun range 13, Second salvo. Third fourth fifth, up to 400.  About 4 seconds later scores hit on bridge and control position, followed immediately by full salvo from enemy, over, no hits. Then approx. 2 salvoes at 5 second interval. Hit amidships, aircraft, bridge. Correction for deflection left between forward turrets. A/A MG's and starboard 3.7 effective against bridge, torpedo tubes and A/A armament. Up to fifth salvo no reply, the "C" turret well and fast.    Hits in funnel and engine room. "D" turret only two or three salvoes, all of them over. "A" and "D" turrets no longer ((firing)). At about eighth or ninth salvo torpedo hit forward of "A" and "D" turrets. Torpedo passed short distance ahead. Stern almost completely submerged. Course 260 maintained since torpedo tubes not manned because of A/A MG fire. Enemy turns sharply towards. Course and speed maintained to get clear. Top of "D" turret flies overboard, further hits forward.

1735 approx.:
Enemy passes astern in unfavourable position for firing his torpedoes. Thick smoke caused by fire in engine room conceals enemy from the bridge. A/A Control Officer continues with stern armament range approx. 40 hm. Enemy's guns pointing to starboard. his A/A/ is not manned.

1745 approx.:
Turned away to port in order to destroy enemy completely. Shortly afterwards revolutions drop rapidly, no communication with engine room. Simultaneously four torpedo tracks. Hold course because questionable whether engines would make the turn and tracks deviate well astern. Course 240. ((Torpedoes)) pass short distance astern. Simultaneously engines break down. LENSCH reports engine room and all fire-extinguishing apparatus completely out of order. Order to try and get at least one engine working. From

1750 approx.:
Gunnery control working again from forward position with whole battery at 60 hm. SIDNEY course south slow speed. On fire from bridge to after funnel. Constant further hits.

1800 approx.:
Single torpedo at 70 hm. inclination 80, speed 5. Miss astern.

1825:
Guns check. Last range 90 hm. Shots 104 hm. relative bearing 225. Rounds fired approx. 500 base fuze, 50 nose fuze. Prepare to scuttle. Lower all boats and life-saving equipment. Impossible to reach engine room; satisfied myself personally of this. No. 2 electric installation working but useless. Enemy disappears from sight at approx. 160 hm, course approx. 150. Glare visible until about 2200 then occasional flickerings.

2100 approx.:
All life-saving apparatus lowered and cast off. Still 124 men on board including almost all officers. Such guns as are still working can thus be manned. Only small quantity of smoke in mine hold. Both boats from no. 2 hatch.

2330 approx.:
Both lowered, one with 59 ((men)). Explosive charge in port forward oil tank.

2355:
Smoke increasing heavily on mining deck.

2400:
Paid off. Touched off charge, last boat cast off.

0035:
Mines explode. Ship sinks rapidly stern first.

(ENGINE ROOM LOG)

19.11.41
Speed 11 knots. Nos. 1 and 4 engines on propulsion, No. 3 engine on ship's supply. On watch Warrant Engineer LENSCH and two Stoker P.O.'s.

1555:
Alarm.  Order from bridge; All engines ready for maximum speed. No. 2 engine turned on to propulsion.

1600:
All watches at action stations:

        1st Watch at working stations, Warrant Engineer NAGEL

        2nd Watch at damage control stations, Warrant Engineer LENSCH

        3rd Watch engine room action parties, Warrant Engineer MITZLAFF

1602:
Report to bridge: Engines ready for maximum speed.

1604:
Report to bridge: No. 4 engine and of order by reason of piston running hot, maximum speed therefore approx. 14 knots.

On the attempt to increase the load of the engines, No. 4 main engine became unserviceable owing to piston 7 running hot. The engine was stopped forthwith, the damaged piston slung, the connecting rod removed and the valve gear disconnected.

1635 approx.
Engine could be put to propulsion again on 8 cylinders. Ship thus again ready for maximum speed.

1715:
Damage control centre shifted from starboard gangway to port gangway, as being probably away from the firing.

1730:
Order from bridge: Remove disguise

1735 approx:
Several hits in main engine room. One shell tore the forward tank bulkhead of the engine room badly open. A thick jet of burning fuel oil poured into the room, which was rapidly filled with opaque smoke. The main fire extinguisher pipe was punctured on either side of the engine room, at the same time the whole foam extinguisher plant which had been transferred to the starboard side went out of action. An explosion on the starboard side rendered the transformers unserviceable, thereby putting the electrical excitation for the main generators and propulsion motors out of action. The whole of the main engine installation was thus out of action.

Report to bridge: Engine installation unserviceable by enemy action, very heavy smoke, query may personnel leave engine room? Order from bridge:  Leave engine room. By this time only No. 2 electrical installation was in order. The attempt by the Chief Plumber to get pressure in the fire extinguisher pipe from the power unit in the propulsion motor room failed, as pressure dropped immediately in the damaged pipe.

1745:
Senior Stoker on watch reports verbally to C.O. on the bridge. At this time the engines failed. C.O. orders to try and get one engine working at least. All attempts to penetrate into engine room failed. First Watchkeeping Officer passed order from C.O. by telephone from Damage Control Centre to Engineer Officer in Control position. Engineer Officer replied that the order could not be carried out and crew of control position, Engineer Officer (corrupt passage) two P.O.'s and two stewards were suffocating. Shortly afterwards control position ceased to report. First Watchkeeping Officer reported to C.O.: engine room finally out of action and no further communication with control position.

Attempts to save crew of control position failed. Only one P.O., Stoker P.O. HAHNERT, succeeded in escaping from teh control position. He states he saw the control position watch killed by a sudden burst of fire while trying unsuccessfully to open the hatch of the splinter grating.

1825:
Order from C.O.: All hands to abandon ship.