"SECTION 22"
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SWPA
AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION
 DURING WWII

Initial RDF Intercept Organisation

It was agreed by representatives of the three Australian military services at a meeting on 29 May 1942 that the development of an R.D.F Interception organisation in the Australian theatre would be the responsibility of the Royal Australian Navy RAN. This was the forerunner of Section 22. It was proposed at the meeting that the new organisation should become an Allied Naval responsibility with the administration being carried out by the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board.

Allied Naval Staff represented by the Naval Board were to direct:-

1. General Policy for enemy RDF investigations
2. Policy concerning jamming of enemy RDF
3. Operational Policy and operations
4. Personnel requirements
5. Analysis and distribution of information concerning enemy RDF
6. Testing, storing and distribution of all equipment
7. Training of operators and mechanics
8. Fitting and trials of equipment in ships, aircraft and ashore

Items 6, 7 and 8 were to be undertaken by the RAN RDF establishment at HMAS Rushcutter. The Naval Board had appointed a Staff Officer for RCM duties who would collaborate with RCM Officers to be nominated by the RAAF and Army Headquarters in the formulation of RCM policy generally and in the direction of area operations. The Naval Staff Officer was also responsible for maintaining liaison with Allied organisations concerned in any way with the investigation of enemy RDF.

Liaison on Intelligence matters was to be dealt with by an Officer of the Directorate of Naval Intelligence. The abovementioned Officers constituted the Headquarters RCM Staff and were responsible for co-ordinating interception policy.

The operational policy of this new RDF Interception organisation was:-

• to place into effective service as many Intercept Receivers as was necessary and to provide adequate coverage of enemy held areas as part of operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. Equipment was to be operated by the units to whom the equipment had been supplied under the guidance of trained RCM Officers and personnel.
• to undertake special missions by air, sea or land where the existence of Japanese installations was suspected
• to equip Allied ships operating in the Northern theatre with receivers for defensive purposes
• to prepare for the operational use of jamming apparatus should the use of this become operational policy

The basis for fitting intercept receivers was as follows:-

Surface Vessels
Naval vessels would be fitted with intercept receivers primarily for detecting surface warning, surface gunnery RDF fitted in enemy vessels and Aircraft/Surface Vessel RDF fitted in enemy aircraft

A program to fit intercept receivers in Submarines was to be undertaken once the necessary technical information was available. Currently being obtained at that time.

Aircraft
As a general principle reconnaissance and bombing aircraft would be fitted primarily for the detection of enemy air warning stations, gunnery and searchlight control equipment ashore and afloat.

Land Forces
Recoding stations were to be setup and equipped with receivers and necessary ancillary equipment to measure accurately all enemy RDF and PRF frequencies and to record those in sound and oscillograms were possible. Mobile units for use with advanced forces would be equipped as required for the operations involved.

Special Missions
Special Missions were to be organised where necessary to equip aircraft, surface vessels, submarines or land forces with suitable equipment to undertake special missions.

Allocation of Receivers

When supplies first priority receivers were not available, receivers of second priority were fitted. Possible variations from the allocation set out depended upon the locality and the results sought. These variations were authorised by the Naval Board.

Upon completion of the fitting of all intercept receivers advice was passed by signal to N.B. (R) C.S.W.P.F. stating the type and number of receivers fitted.

The following allocation policy was to be followed as far as possible:-

Field Organisation

The Southwest Pacific Area was divided into two search areas for the purpose of setting up an R.D.F. Intercept field organisation:-

Eastern Area - with a field centre in Townsville covered the North Eastern, Eastern and Southern Areas of the SWPA.

Western Area - with a field centre at Darwin covered the North Western and South Western areas of the SWPA.

An Area R.C.M. Officer, known as an A.R.C.M.O. was appointed to each area together with sufficient R.C.M. mechanics to enable equipment operating in the area to be properly fitted, tested and maintained. He was also responsible for maintaining contact with all operating units in his area, and for advising operating units and carrying out R.C.M. policy generally.

Area R.C.M. Officers were provided with necessary authority in the form of a directive from COMSOUWESPAC under which their duties were defined.

The fitting of R.C.M. receivers in Allied ships and aircraft followed the priority setout in Annexes 1 and 2 (see below). Fittings for special missions were undertaken at the direction of the Naval Board.

Allied Operational Headquarters, Commanding Officers of Navy, Army and Air Force Establishments and Units in investigation areas were advised by Naval Board through their respective Headquarters of the R.C.M. organisation and its objectives.

Collection and Distribution of Information

Enemy R.D.F. information obtained in the field by R.C.M. or other personnel was regarded as secret enemy intelligence and passed by most rapid and secure channels to Naval Board, with a copy being sent to the Area R.C.M. Officer through N.O.I.C. Townsville or Darwin respectively. These messages were prefixed by the word "SNARK" which served to identify them. They were then followed by an amplifying report at the earliest opportunity.

Responsibility for analysing and distributing this information rested with the Naval Board who took necessary action to secure any advice required to evaluate the field reports.

On receipt of enemy information, Area R.C.M. Officers made contact with the reporting unit as soon as possible and furnished a report to the Naval Board at the earlier possible moment. The report was distinguished by prefixing with the word "SNARK".

R.C.M. Reports were classified as three star, two star or one star according to the reliability of value placed upon them by the originator. This was system was used with caution and intelligence.

Three Star reports were passed by signal to Naval Board who would then circulate the report to the following:-

COMWOUWESPACFOR
Admiralty
C. in C. Eastern Fleet
C.O.I.S. Eastern Fleet
R.A.A.F. H.Q. Melbourne
L.H.Q. Melbourne
N.Z. Naval Board

Two Star reports were passed by signal to the Naval Board who would then distribute them as per three star reports but they would make clear the limitation of the report.

One Star reports were passed to the Naval Board by secret memorandum and were given restricted distribution depending on the nature of the report and were accompanied by explanatory clauses. Distribution was limited to teh following:-

COMSOUWESPACFOR
R.A.A.F. Headquarters Melbourne
L.H.Q. Melbourne

R.C.M. reports of enemy R.D.F. could only be regarded as official when issued by the Naval Board.

Classification of Information

Routine Reports

Area R.C.M. Officers submitted monthly routine reports on the operations and activities in their areas by the first of each month. They were correlated by the Naval Board and distributed as follows:-

COMSOUWESPACFOR
Admiralty
C. in C. Eastern Fleet
C.O.I.S. Eastern Fleet
R.A.A.F. HQ Melb.
L.H.Q. Melbourne

Operational Use of Equipment and allocation of Personnel

R.C.M. Equipment was handed over to Allied and Australian Forces for them to be operated by personnel nominated by the Service who had been trained at HMAS Rushcutter. They would operate the equipment under the guidance of the Area R.C.M. Officer. Maintenance was carried out by mechanics under the guidance of the Area R.C.M Officer. They had been nominated by the Service and trained at HMAS Rushcutter.

Personnel requirements for the operation and maintenance of equipment was assessed by R.C.M. Headquarters Staff who were responsible for securing the personnel required from the services and for drafting them to HMAS Rushcutter for training and forwarding them to operating units.

Liaison with other Organisations

Liason with Central Bureau in Melbourne was maintained through Headquarters Staff. Liaison was also established with Monterey (Central Bureau) and A.T.I.S. in Brisbane.

NAA File

Annex No. 3

NAA File

Annex No. 4

NAA File

Draft replacement for Annex No. 4

NAA File

Replacement for Annex No. 4 approved by the Department of the Navy

Lieutenant Colonel R. O. Cherry was the nominated Australian Army representative on the new R.C.M. Organisation's Headquarters Staff.

GHQ SWPA Operations Instructions No. 36, dated 5 July 1943 established the Radar and Radio Countermeasures Division (later "Section 22"), in General Headquarters, SWPA as a multinational organization under the Chief Signal Officer at GHQ SWPA, Major General Spencer B. Akin  - see the above replica of this document. Its role was to collect electronic intelligence about the increasing number of Japanese radar sets deployed in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA). "Section 22" was responsible for the coordination of Allied electronic reconnaissance. The organisation got its name from the fact that its forerunner was started in about May 1942 in Room No. 22, possibly in the New Zealand Insurance Building at 334 Queen Street, Brisbane. Section 22 used the codename "Snark" when sending messages to and from its Field Units.

Unlike Central Bureau, Brisbane, which was a purely cryptologic organization, "Section 22" included personnel from the Navy, Marine Corps, Signal Corps, Army Air Forces, and foreign personnel. Personnel included members of the U.S. military along with British, Australian, New Zealand and Dutch allies.

"Section 22" was responsible for collecting information on Japanese radar and radio systems, analysis, dissemination of the resulting intelligence and requisitioning and assigning electronic countermeasures/reconnaissance personnel and equipment. By mid-1943 USAAF B-24D Ferret aircraft had been assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, and "Section 22" started to assemble a detailed picture of the Japanese radar network in the area. "Section 22" soon realised the effectiveness of operations using dedicated AAF Ferrets and soon forced the US Navy into a similar mode of operation.

The B-24D Ferret (a modified Liberator) was equipped with the SCR-587 receiver and a developmental version of a radar pulse analyzer which became a vital tool to assist the airborne operators in identifying the type of enemy radar being intercepted.

In March 1944, Patrol Bombing Squadron VPB-116, which was based on the recently captured Eniwetok Atoll, began flying electronic reconnaissance missions around the Japanese naval base at Truk in the Caroline Islands. Their PB4Y-ls, with their electronic reconnaissance equipment, were used to locate and collect information on the Japanese radar installations on Truk. This data was then used to great effect during the aircraft carrier air strikes on the Eniwetok Atoll.

Patrol Bombing Squadron VPB-116 had its beginnings as Bombing Squadron VB-116 which was established on 1 December 1943. It was redesignated to VPB-116 on 1 October 1944.

It was clear in 1944, that the AAF's permanently modified Ferret aircraft used exclusively for electronic reconnaissance, were considerably more effective than the US Navy's makeshift installations operated by their "gypsy" air crewmen. "Section 22" directed the formation of a dedicated US Navy unit, where all its personnel, equipment and aircraft would be responsible solely for the electronic reconnaissance role.

Lt Lawrence Heron was selected to form and command this new dedicated airborne electronic reconnaissance unit which was temporarily based at the Palm Island Naval Air Station near Townsville in north Queensland. The unit was equipped with two PBY-5A Black Cat (Catalinas) to be modified for electronic reconnaissance.

ARC-l receivers were installed in the Catalinas and a locally manufactured direction-finding antenna system was used. The new DF antenna pointed downward from the rear fuselage gun hatch, which meant that the antennae could not remain in place prior to take off. It was manually reattached after takeoff which initially proved quite a challenge for the members of this special unit.

After these modifications and some training the Black Cats eventually left NAS Palm Island for New Guinea to begin flying electronic reconnaissance missions from the seaplane bases at Port Moresby and Samari Islands. By late 1944 Lt Heron's Black Cats were flying electronic missions out of the Philippines.

The Australian Group Radiation Laboratory led by Doctor S. Seely, was part of the Radiophysics Laboratory, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research organisation CSIR based in Sydney, New South Wales. It carried out research work on radar countermeasures.

A Report dated 6 September 1944, titled "Radio Countermeasures in Southwest Pacific Area" stated the following:-

"RCM work, both radio and radar, in the SWPA are under the direction and control of Section 22. ....... Section 22 is organized as part of the Chief Signal Officer's Office of GHQ and is an Allied setup. It is divided into two main departments, radio and radar. The radio section is headed by Major T.L. Meede and consists of seven officers and about eight enlisted men. A portion of its personnel are engaged in traffic analysis, the purpose of which is to analyze radio traffic and artificially build up the circuit loads to prevent enemy intelligence from forecasting coming operations by observing increased volume of traffic on certain circuits. The remainder of teh group has extended their efforts toward the investigation of enemy attempts at jamming and the training of communication personnel in anti-jamming technique."

"Search Program"

"Up to the present time no attempt has been made to actuate offensive measures against enemy radio circuits. Considerably more information than is now available a to the enemy use of various radio channels is necessary, before such offensive measures can be put into use. With this in mind the work of teh radio section has been directed toward the accuring of information as to the enemy use of radio channels particularly those in the VHF range. A discussion of the need and means of such investigations was presented to the Chief Signal Officer and a copy of this presentation is attached to these notes."

"As a result of the efforts of Section 22, permission to install monitoring receivers in a few operational aircraft of the 380th Bomber Group was obtained and six Hallicrafter S-27 receivers were installed in six aircraft. The S-27 receivers were used since they were the only type available in the theater. Operators were selected and trained in the operation of the search receivers and now accompany these aircraft on strike missions."

"Results on the first few missions have been largely negative due to the nature of the strike missions and teh fact that no interception has been made on any of these missions. The operational area of the 380th Bomber Group is being changed at present and when it is again operating, the search operators will again accompany each mission."

"To supplement aircraft search, Section 22 is at present completing plans to utilize the RCM personnel secured from the South Pacific to make up a number of ground intercept groups for the purpose of making detailed studies of enemy use of communication channels. These ground teams will be located in areas where aircraft search indicates that enemy stations can be reasonably expected to be picked up by monitoring receivers. It is hoped that sufficient information as to enemy use of radio channels will be obtained to make such plans and arrangements for offensive countermeasures as may appear feasible."

"Defensive Countermeasures"

"Efforts on the part of the Japanese to interfere with Allied communications have been somewhat scattered and appear to be conducted on a relatively small scale. However, a number of attempts to interfere with Allied radio channels have been highly successful and it appears that a number of those attempts have been in the nature of experiments which may be the forerunner of operations on a considerably larger scale. Reports of these attempts have been somewhat incomplete and inconclusive due to lack of monitoring and DFing equipment with which to investigate the jamming signal. Section 22 is making every effort to improve the quality of jamming reports by providing information and other necessary assistance to the communications people so that jamming attempts of the enemy can be more adequately analyzed."

"An anti-jamming training group has been formed of Section 22 personnel. Equipped with jamming training recordings, jamming modulators, demonstration jamming equipment and anti-jamming training information, this unit is available to Signal Officers of the various operating groups for assistance in the training of communication personnel. At the present time, this unit is assisting the Signal Officer of the 13th Air Force at Bougainville in the training of radio operators in ant-jamming techniques. Most of the operating groups in the theater are alert to the possibility of enemy action against communication circuits and are very much interested in defensive measures. Considerable ingenuity is being demonstrated by the radio officers and operators in coping with enemy jamming attempts and it appears that the above-mentioned training program will broaden the ability of all communication personnel to meet the attempts at jamming communication circuits by the enemy."

"Offensive Countermeasures"

As mentioned above no attempt at jamming enemy tactical radio circuits has been made in the SWPA. Plans of proposed action for future operations have been prepared by Section 22 and these plans bring out the future need in this area of two types of jamming equipments which, up to the present, have not been made available in this theater. The first is an easily tuned jammer of moderate to high power in the HF (2 to 25 mc) range. Due to the extensive use by the Japanese of HF circuits, an effective offensive countermeasure operation must include the use of some ground based spot jammer operating in this range. Since the type of operation frequently precludes the use of motor trucks, this jammer must be portable, capable of being transported by not more than three or four men and must be a complete jamming system with received and tracking arrangements. Because we also make exclusive use of the HF range, tuning arrangements of the jammer should be simple and accurate to avoid any interference with friendly communications. In view of the time factor it appears most desirable that this jammer, if possible, be a modification of some existing equipment. In this connection Section 22 is making a study of several Australian made transceivers with a view toward modifying as jammers. It is our opinion that a similar investigation of United States equipment should be made here. The second is a semi-barrage expandable jammer for the HF range. This jammer should be similar to Chick type jammers with the exception that instead of being placed from and aircraft by means of parachutes these jammers would be placed by patrols or other personnel. A more complete description of this type of jammer is included in Report No. 2."

"The attitude of the various operating groups is the theater toward offensive countermeasures is decidedly cool. It is the general opinion that the type of warfare now being conducted in the theater can offer little opportunity for the use of radio countermeasures...............

The following entries are from the Military Telephone Books for Brisbane during WWII:-

TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OCTOBER 1943 - RESTRICTED

SECTION 22.

TELEPHONE DIRECTORY MAY 1944 - RESTRICTED

SECTION 22.

TELEPHONE DIRECTORY FEBRUARY 1945 - RESTRICTED

SECTION 22.

Note: - By February 1945, the Chief Signal Officer was Lt. Col. Ernst, J.M.

Section 22 also used the top floor of the Walter Reid building in Charlotte Street, Brisbane to store records etc. A fire started in the Section 22 area on the top floor on the evening of 5 November 1944. A newspaper article in the Truth (Brisbane) on 21 January 1945 suggested an espionage angle theorising that there was a link between the murder of Lieutenant Middleton and a major fire in the Walter Reid building. The article indicated that Lt. Middleton was a member of the US Army Signal Corps and that his work was of a highly secretive and confidential nature. Perhaps he was a member of Section 22.

Organisation of Section 22, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, October 7, 1944

Does anyone have a better copy of this diagram?

In May 1944, the Section 22 RCM organisation comprised the following personnel:-

At 7 October 1944, Section 22 had a number of Field Units (see above diagram) as follows:-

NOTE:- The above diagram appears to show that there was a Section 22 Test Lab in Sydney, New South Wales. This would have been the Australian Group Radiation Laboratory led by Doctor S. Seely, which was part of the Radiophysics Laboratory, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research organisation CSIR based in Sydney, NSW.

Also shows Liaison Offices (L.O.) in Washington D.C. and London.

The 3144th Signal Service Platoon was one of two provisional RCM platoons used in the 1943 Louisiana and Tennessee Maneuvers. It was made a numbered unit and sent to the SWPA. An Archie W. Searls served with the 3144th Signal Service Detachment.

The 3153rd Signal Service Company was a radio deception unit which sent in 1944 to the SWPA.

The War Diary of USS PCE(R) 849 has the following entries:-

14 July 1945 - Today we received orders to proceed to Okinawa Shima on 16 July 1945. Due to the critical lack of shipping space available we are to transport Section 22 of GHQ Signal Corps to Nakagusuku Wan.

15 July 1945 - We got underway this morning to go alongside Pier 15, South Manila Harbor to take aboard 20 tons of Labatory (sic) equipment. a jeep and trailer for Section 22. At 1150 we got underway to go alongside the USS APA 235 for fresh water and at 1506 we got underway again to the USS Panda (IX 125) for fuel and lube oil in the Outer South Harbor. At 1855 we returned to our anchorage in South Manila Harbor. At 2000 the Section 22 personnel reported aboard for transportation. There are two officers, two Army civilian technicians, and nine enlisted men. Section 22 is composed of a radar counter measures team. They will set up a labatory (sic) on Okinawa and assist the Air Forces stations there in solving Radar Field problems, and develope (sic) effective measures of preventing enemy jaming (sic) of radar screens.

17 July 1945 - When we arrived at Nakagusuku Wan on 20 July (?), we learned that the convoy had been rerouted because floating mines were sighted along the assigned convoy route.

20 July 1945 - .... As we approached Okinawa Jima to leeward the swells decreased and we were able to proceed into the harbor without difficulties. At 1325 we anchored in Buckner Bay (Nakagusuku Wan) to report to Colonel Pochyla, Executive Officer, Signal Corps AFPAC.

23 July 1945 - ..... At 1514 we got underway for Namarida Saki on the western side of Okinawa Shima. Here we are to unload the Signal Corps equipment and disembard (sic) the Army and civilian personnel.

The "Action Reports, PT 128 and PT 129, Night of 13/14 January 1945" for Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Seven shows the following entry:-

One serviceable but unoccupied enemy type "A" navy barge was sunk. Also radar materiel valuable for intelligence purposes was taken from an enemy APD in San Isidro Bay. This material, removed under supervision of Lt. R.H. Michell, RANVR and Lt. Acreman, AIF, was tuned over for further study to Section 22 of GHQ, U.S. Army at Tacloban, Leyte, I.

The Muster Roll of the Crew of the "USS Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Thirty Three" shows the following entry for 31 March 1945:-

War Diary of Commander Aircraft, Seventh Fleet has the following entry:-

30 November 1943 - One PBY-5 aircraft of Fleet Air Wing Seventeen ordered assigned to Chief Signal Officer, Section 22 for use on radar countermeasure missions, at the request of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area.

FIELD UNIT 15 - 24 SQUADRON RAAF

FROM THE LIFE STORY OF BERNARD HOSIE

Bernard Hosie

Photos of SCR-717-B radar unit in B-24-D Ferret at Archerfield airfield in Brisbane

Photo:- NARA-SWPA-SC-44-6417

Front view of SCR-717-B radar unit installed in a B-24-D
Ferret at Archerfield airfield, Brisbane on 24 April 1944

Photo:- NARA-SWPA-SC-44-1219

Front view of SCR-717-B radar unit installed in a B-24-D
Ferret at Archerfield airfield, Brisbane on 4 May 1944

Photo:- NARA-SWPA-SC-44-6416

Rear view of SCR-717-B Radar Unit installed in a B-24-D
Ferret at Archerfield Airfield on 24 April 1944

Photo:- NARA-SWPA-SC-44-6418

Radar Compartment installed in the B-24-D Ferret from
the rear at Archerfield Airfield on 24 April 1944

Photo:- NARA-SWPA-SC-44-1220

Radar compartment installed in a B-24-D Ferret at Archerfield Airfield on 4 May 1944

Photo:- NARA SWPA-SC-44-1217

Position of SCR-717-B radar equipment in bombardier compartment of a
B-24-D Ferret at Archerfield airfield, Brisbane, Australia on 5 May 1944

Photo:- NARA-SWPA-SC-44-6420

New position of Navigator's Compartment for operation of new Radar Equipment
on the inside (forward) of a B-24-D Ferret at Archerfield airfield on 24 April 1944

The RAAF's Role in Radio Countermeasures and Section 22 is covered in the following extract from a document titled "Development and Use of Radar in the RAAF:-

Radio Countermeasures

Early in 1942 there occurred an event which shook the allied Radar organisations to its foundations. The German battle ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau which had been sheltering at Brest for some considerable time broke out under cover of bad weather and sailed through the English Channel under the noses of the British defences. Just when the RAF radar system was about to be used for attacks on these vessels it was suddenly put almost out of action by a barrage of enemy jammers on the French coast. The possibilities of jamming had been foreseen by the designers of radar but this was the first occasion on which it had been used and it was significant that only an experimental 10 centimeter radar which was in use at Dover was not affected. The fact that this radar could not pass its information owing to poor communications was incidental.

This event marked the inauguration of an entirely new activity in radar which came to be know as Radio Countermeasures or RCM. In Australia the Navy was the first to be interested in RCM, their main interest at the time being the provision of a receiver to be carried in ships to pick up enemy radar transmissions, thus giving warning that the ship was under radar observation by the enemy. The matter did not receive very great attention however until 1943 when GHQ took an interest in it, forming "Section 22" which was charged with all matters concerning RCM. This section which had available to it all the facilities of the American forces in the area, collected reports from agents, from receivers carried in submarines and from landing forces as at Guadalcanal and was able to build up a fair picture of the Japanese radar organisation.

RAAF interest in RCM commenced when Section 22 borrowed RAAF Personnel to fit special receivers to American aircraft and fly with them on missions over enemy territory. Later similar receivers were fitted to RAAF aircraft in the North Australian areas but it was soon discovered that the use of operational aircraft for this purpose had considerable disadvantages. These aircraft were concerned solely with dropping bombs or fulfilling their reconnaissance mission and returning to base, and only exceptional crews would devote time to searching in enemy areas for possible radar transmissions.

Usually problems of serviceability and operational losses also arose and toward the end of 1944 it was decided to follow British and American practice and establish RAAF aircraft specially for RCM duties.

These aircraft were to be know as Ferret aircraft and would be fitted with an array of receivers, recorders and analysers. In the meantime RAAF Headquarters decided to become better informed on RCM matters and early in 1944 two radar officers, Flt. Lt's Nash and Thomas were sent to England to make a thorough examination of the RCM organisation. On their return they took up the cause of RCM and concentrated their interests on the Ferret project. Early in 1945 No. 201 Flight was established comprising two Liberator aircraft under the command of Wing Commander C.S. Davis, and these aircraft were allotted to APU for special fitment as Ferrets.

An extensive programme of RCM was commenced. All RAAF Radar and Signals equipment was examinded for possible anti-jamming modifications, special operators were trained in Kana for Ferret purposes, a number of training teams were formed to introduce RCM techniques in operational areas, and an RCM training manual was produced. As time went on it became increasingly obvious that the RCM programme would be too late. The war was moving rapidly towards Japan, the Philippines had been captured, the remaining Japanese forces in the islands were more or less disorganised and certainly represented no menace from the RCM point of view. It was unlikely that the Liberators would have a job to do. In actual fact the war ended before they were put to operational use. The experience gained was valuable but it has probably been lost by the departure of the officers concerned from the Service.

Identification Friend or Foe IFF

Field Unit 2 of Section 22 found that Identification Friend or Foe units were being left on until about 10 minutes from the Japanese target. During one flight to Davao on 18 September 1944, the IFFs were constantly being triggered by enemy signals, thus providing the enemy better warning of the arrival of Allied aircraft than their radar.

Field Unit 9 of Section 22, also encountered a number of incidents where Japanese radars triggered their Aircraft's ABK IFF transponder.

REFERENCE

"A History of US Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance, Part 1, The Pacific and VQ-1"
by Captain Don C. East, USN

Sensational New Theory in City
ESPIONAGE ANGLE CONSIDERED
Link with Fire?
Truth (Brisbane) 21 January 1945

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I'd like to thank Bill Bentson (now deceased) for his assistance with this home page.

I'd also like to thank Trent Telenko, Craig Bellamy, David Glerean, David Dufty, Bernard Hosie and Bob Livingstone for their assistance with this web page.

Can anyone help me with more information?

"Australia @ War" WWII Research Products

This page first produced 17 March 2002

This page last updated 22 February 2021